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A Secure Integrated Framework for
Fog-Assisted Internet of Things Systems
Aisha Kanwal Junejo, Nikos Komninos, Member, IEEE , and Julie A. McCann, Member, IEEE
Abstract—Fog-Assisted Internet of Things (Fog-IoT) systems are deployed in remote and unprotected environments, making them
vulnerable to security, privacy, and trust challenges. Existing studies propose security schemes and trust models for these systems.
However, mitigation of insider attacks, namely blackhole, sinkhole, sybil, collusion, self-promotion, and privilege escalation, has always
been a challenge and mostly carried out by the legitimate nodes. Compared to other studies, this paper proposes a framework featuring
attribute-based access control and trust-based behavioural monitoring to address the challenges mentioned above. The proposed
framework consists of two components, the security component (SC) and the trust management component (TMC). SC ensures data
confidentiality, integrity, authentication, and authorization. TMC evaluates Fog-IoT entities’ performance using a trust model based on a
set of QoS and network communication features. Subsequently, trust is embedded as an attribute within SC’s access control policies,
ensuring that only trusted entities are granted access to fog resources. Several attacking scenarios, namely DoS, DDoS, probing, and
data theft are designed to elaborate on how the change in trust triggers the change in access rights and, therefore, validates the proposed
integrated framework’s design principles. The framework is evaluated on a Raspberry Pi 3 Model B to benchmark its performance in
terms of time and memory complexity. Our results show that both SC and TMC are lightweight and suitable for resource-constrained
devices.
Index Terms—Fog Computing, Internet of Things (IoT), Security, Trust and Credibility
F
1 INTRODUCTION
N EXT generation fog-assisted internet of things (Fog-IoT) systems extend the functionality, features and
capabilities of fog computing and the Internet of Things
(IoT). Such systems are suitable for IoT systems as ser-
vices with reduced latency, network jitter, and bandwidth
are located near the network’s edge [1]. However, Fog-
IoT systems face numerous security and trust challenges.
Resource limited nature of IoT devices and lack of protection
mechanisms make these systems an easy target for the
attackers. The machine to machine (M2M) communication
between sensors, actuators, fog nodes, and cloud services
can be compromised via several attacks such as interception
(i.e., eavesdropping), interruption (i.e., DoS attacks), mod-
ification (i.e., packet payload manipulation in transit) and
fabrication (i.e., a man-in-the-middle attack). These attack
mechanisms violate security goals namely, confidentiality,
integrity, availability, authentication, and access control.
Fog-based systems also face trust issues because, unlike
cloud servers, fog nodes are located in remote and unpro-
tected environments, making them vulnerable to tampering
and node capture attacks. Fog computing features, namely
location awareness, mobility, and decentralized architec-
ture, also introduce trust challenges. With no centralized
network, the fog nodes can join and leave the system
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frequently, mainly due to the inability to provide quality
of service (QoS), load balancing, device compromise, or
user/operator error. Such cases also raise concerns about
secure handling of sensitive data, device logs and network
access information. Additionally, the malicious nodes with
otherwise legitimate identities can also impact the trust of
Fog-IoT entities by reporting fabricated sensory data and
routing information.
1.1 Motivation
Having discussed the security and trust challenges, it is clear
that the establishment of trustworthy systems requires ro-
bust security and trust mechanisms. Data encryption, iden-
tity, and access management can prevent data modification
and fake entities from joining a Fog-IoT system, but they
cannot guarantee that entities have not been compromised.
Without trust mechanisms, the interactions between fog
nodes and IoT devices are subject to risk and uncertainty
and, therefore, necessitate that they must have a certain level
of trust in one another.
Following this, a few recent studies proposed for fog
based IoT systems are discussed. Miranda et al. [2] propose
a security framework for the detection and prevention of
intrusions in software-defined networks. Hao et al. [3] pro-
pose a collaborative game theory-based security detection
framework for IoT to model the confrontation between
attacker and defender to identify security events. Moreover,
collaborative information sharing is achieved by consensus
protocol. Nabil et al. [4] propose a trustworthiness scheme
for mitigating routing attacks, namely Rank and Blackhole,
against RPL. The studies cited above [2]- [4] have various
limitations, 1) security and trust challenges are addressed
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separately and no study follows an integrated approach, 2)
the security frameworks do not achieve the fundamental
security goals, namely data confidentiality, integrity, authen-
tication, and authorization, and 3) most of the trust models
proposed for Fog-IoT systems do not consider a hostile
environment. A few consider a hostile environment but do
not propose appropriate mitigation strategies.
Compared to other studies, this paper proposes a frame-
work featuring attribute-based access control and trust-
based behavioural monitoring to address the challenges
mentioned above. To the best of authors’ knowledge, this
is the first work which takes an integrated approach for
Fog-IoT systems. The proposed framework consists of two
key components, 1) the security component (SC) and 2) the
trust management component (TMC). The SC ensures all
entities of Fog-IoT, i.e. fog nodes and IoT devices, have
unique identities and only authorized parties can access
the fog resources. TMC evaluates their trustworthiness by
computing trust based on a set of QoS and network commu-
nication features. Trust computed by TMC is subsequently
integrated into SC. Precisely, trust is used as an attribute in
access control policies to guarantee that only trusted entities
can request fog services and collaborate with other entities
in the system.
As part of the SC, a lightweight attribute based encryp-
tion (ABE) scheme is proposed to achieve the security goals
i.e., data confidentiality, integrity, authentication, and au-
thorization. TMC guarantees dependable behavior of the
Fog-IoT entities by robust behavioral monitoring and trust
computation. Additionally, a credibility model is designed
as a subcomponent of TMC to countermeasure several at-
tacks including but not limited to DoS (Denial of Service) ,
DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service), Reconnaissance, and
data theft attacks, which aim to affect the accuracy of the
trust computation process. Precisely, the integration enables
the enforcement of access rights based on the performance
of the Fog-IoT entities.
1.2 Contribution
The contribution of this paper is three-fold.
First, a secure integrated framework which addresses the se-
curity and trust challenges of Fog-IoT systems is proposed.
Second, trust is embedded as an attribute in the access
control policies to elaborate on the integration of SC and
TMC.
Third, the proposed framework’s design principles are val-
idated by modelling several attacking scenarios to elaborate
on how the change in trust triggers the change in access
rights. For instance, a fog node’s access rights can escalate
from ”write and execute” to ”All” if its trust has increased
over time and vice versa. However, an increase/decrease
in trust can be subject to malicious behaviour of compro-
mised Fog-IoT entities; this is where the proposed credibility
model plays its role and controls the rate of change of trust
beyond a predefined threshold value. As a result, the access
rights also do not change dramatically and therefore enable
a dependable Fog-IoT system.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The re-
lated work is presented in section 2. The proposed secure
integrated framework is elaborated in section 3. The experi-
mental results are discussed in section 4. The conclusion and
future work are presented in section 5.
2 RELATED WORK
As the research in fog computing is in its infancy so there
are very few frameworks. Nevertheless, some related frame-
works, security schemes, and trust models are discussed
below.
1. Frameworks: Soukup et al. [5] propose a hardware
agnostic security framework for fog based IoT networks.
It consists of collectors, detectors, and management tools
to detect and mitigate the vulnerabilities in several IoT
protocols, namely Z-Wave, Long Range Wide Area Network
(Lo-RaWAN), and BLE. The study in [2] proposes a security
framework for the detection and prevention of intrusions
in software defined networks. The framework consists of
an authentication scheme to prevent unauthorized entities
from joining the network, complemented by a monitoring
system to mitigate the intrusions reported by the sensor
nodes. The study in [6] adopts a graph modelling approach
to determine the relationship between vulnerabilities in an
industrial IoT system where the security issues are formu-
lated as graph-theoretic problems. The study also proposes
some risk mitigation strategies to detect and remove the
attack paths with high risk and low hop-length.
Muhammad et al. [7] propose a surveillance framework
for IoT systems using probabilistic image encryption. The
study uses a video stigmatization method to extract the
information frames and further encrypts the images to
prevent data modification attacks. Fadi et al. [8] propose a
key agreement framework based on the mobile-sink strat-
egy and extends user authentication to the cloud-based
applications. It is based on bilinear pairing and elliptic
curve cryptography (ECC). Alhanahnah et al. [9] propose
a context-aware multifaceted trust framework for evaluat-
ing the trustworthiness of cloud services. Overall, trust in
a cloud service is computed by considering both service
characteristics and user experience. Service level agreement
(SLA) based trust is computed by employing the analytic
hierarchy process (AHP), whereas the non-SLA based trust
is computed by fuzzy simple additive weighting (FSAW).
2. Security Schemes: Jian et al. [10] propose a three-party
authentication and key agreement protocol for fog based IoT
health systems. The protocol is based on bilinear pairing.
The cloud authenticates fog nodes and IoT devices and gen-
erates a shared secret key for them. Yeh et al. [11] propose a
variant of ciphertext-policy attribute based encryption (CP-
ABE) scheme for eHealth systems. It employs fine-grained
access control in cloud-based personal health care applica-
tions. Mick et. al [12] propose a lightweight authentication
and secure routing scheme for smart cities. Mahmood et al.
[13] propose an authentication scheme for smart gird. The
major limitation of this scheme is the scalability in case of
large-scale IoT systems. Some studies also propose proxy
re-encryption schemes whereby fog nodes re-encrypt the
ciphertexts and/or keys for end devices. Wang et al. [14]
propose an ID-based proxy re-encryption scheme to secure
the communication between end devices and cloud that
is leakage resilient in an auxiliary input model. It follows
a hybrid encryption approach wherein the data files are
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encrypted using symmetric keys, while the symmetric keys
are encrypted with the master public keys.
3. Trust Models: Lu et al. [15] propose a trust model
for evaluating the trustworthiness of cloud services by
combining objective and subjective evidence. The study in
[16] employs fog computing to evaluate trustworthiness
in sensor-cloud systems. It proposes a hierarchical trust
computation mechanism to compute trust in the sensor
network and between sensor service providers and cloud
service providers. Ivan et al. [17] propose a technique for
securing the Internet of Vehicles (IoV) systems. The security
technique uses prioritization rules, digital certificates, and
trust and reputation policies for detecting hijacked vehicles.
Haddadou et al. [18] propose a job market signaling scheme
for incentive and trust management in vehicular ad hoc
networks. The scheme countermeasures the malicious nodes
which aim to degrade the network by spreading false and
forged data. Alemneh et al. [19] propose a TMS where both
service requester and service provider can evaluate each
other’s reliability prior to any interaction. The trust model
is based on subjective logic and mitigates malicious nodes’
behaviour to manipulate the trust results. Esposito et al.
[20] address the trust issues of IoT systems by proposing
a game theoretic based model. A signaling game is modeled
to avoid false reputation scores sent by compromised IoT
devices. Liang et al. [21] propose a trust model for social
sensor networks based on multisource feedback and fog
computing. The sensor nodes give feedback about other
nodes after an interaction, and fog nodes also monitor them
and generate the feedback. The trust for each sensor device
is computed by aggregating feedback from multiple sources.
3. Discussion: From the literature review, it is clear that
none of the existing frameworks and/or studies adopts an
integrated approach to simultaneously address the security
and trust issues. The existing security schemes have several
limitations. The generation, verification, and distribution of
certificates in public key encryption (PKE) schemes incur
heavy computation and communication overhead, which is
not desirable for resource limited IoT devices. In large-scale
networks, key generation and management in symmetric
schemes are not trivial. Each node needs n− 1 keys to com-
municate with other nodes. The existing ABE schemes based
on bilinear pairing requiring large security parameters are
computationally expensive and need a lot of processing and
memory resources. The trust models proposed for fog based
IoT systems do not consider a hostile environment wherein
the malicious nodes can join the network and carry out
cyber attacks, namely blackhole, sinkhole, Sybil, collusion,
self-promotion, bad-mouthing, ballot-stuffing, and provid-
ing opportunistic service. The compromised entities can
affect the accuracy of trust model by increasing/decreasing
the trust and, therefore risk the credibility and trustworthi-
ness of Fog-IoT systems. The challenges mentioned above
underline that both security and trust challenges must be
simultaneously addressed to protect open and distributed
systems.
3 PROPOSED INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK
In this section, we present our proposed integrated frame-
work for Fog-IoT systems.
TABLE 1: Notations and their Meanings
Notation Description
U Attribute Universe
A Device Attribute Set
P Access Policy
MPK/MSK Master public and secret key pair
ku Device secret key
CT Ciphertext
M Message
n time window for trust evaluation
t time instance for QoS evidence gathering
Tt(fi) instant trust of ith fog node at time t
Tfo→fog Fog node objective trust computed by FO
Tiot→fog IoT Device trust based
Tfog Fog node trust
α weight for Tiot→fog
c(i, fj) parameters sent by ith CPS device for jth fog node
σ standard deviation of Tiot→fog over a time window n
3.1 System Model
As shown in Fig. 1, a general Fog-IoT system consists of
three layers, namely, IoT Devices, Fog Nodes, and Cloud.
The IoT Devices layer consists of smart devices, namely
smart meters, smart refrigerators, smart garage doors,
health monitoring devices, weather monitoring systems,
smart lights, and smart thermostats. The Fog Nodes layer
consists of network equipment, such as routers, bridges,
gateways, switches, and base stations, augmented with the
computational capability and local servers (e.g., industrial
controllers, embedded servers, mobile phones, and video
surveillance cameras). The fog layer has two types of enti-
ties: fog nodes and Fog Orchestrator (FO) nodes. The FO
nodes are dedicated to service orchestration, trust man-
agement, and robust identity and access management. FO
nodes also manage the proposed integrated framework. The
Cloud layer is a consolidated computing and storage plat-
form that provides various applications for the acquisition,
processing, presentation, and management of the Fog-IoT
systems.
3.2 Threat Model
A threat model is considered whereby Fog-IoT entities
are divided into three categories, honest, semi-honest, and
dishonest. The cloud is honest but curious. It extends the
services of fog nodes and follows the protocol specification
in general but, at the same time, gathers information about
services, users and location, etc. The fog nodes, FO, and
IoT devices are considered semi-honest as they can be
compromised and vulnerable to security and trust attacks.
Following this, the security threats are discussed. Unen-
crypted messages can be intercepted and modified to violate
confidentiality and integrity. Likewise, a few compromised
fog nodes can be exploited for carrying out botnet attacks,
namely DoS, DDoS, probing, and data theft. The DoS and
DDoS attacks violate the availability and prevent the le-
gitimate nodes from providing services, and in that case,
IoT devices consider them as untrustworthy. Additionally,
malicious fog nodes can let multiple compromised IoT
devices register with the same identity (Sybil attack) and
escalate/deescalate their access privileges.
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Fig. 1: A Secure Integrated Framework for Fog-IoT Systems
It is essential to compute the trust of each entity in
the Fog-IoT system. However, the compromised nodes can
corrupt the trust model by reporting false parameters,
which, therefore, necessitates to evaluate trust credibility.
In a self-promotion attack, malicious bot nodes can report
false parameters to increase their trust. Similarly, they report
false parameters about peers in a bad-mouthing attack. IoT
devices can follow the same attacking strategy to decrease
the trust of fog nodes. In opportunistic and on-off attacks,
fog nodes can provide good/bad quality of service based on
their resources. Like DoS, in collusion attacks, an adversary
can create a botnet to modify the trust of target nodes. In
a Sybil attack, a fog node can create several fake IDs to re-
port fabricated parameters. The ballot stuffing attack occurs
when a device submits more parameters than permitted
in a given time period. The immediate effect of the above
attacks is the imprecise trust computation, which contradicts
nodes’ real performance and requires effective detection and
mitigation techniques for trust computation.
The components of the proposed framework are dis-
cussed in the following paragraphs. Table 1 lists the notation
used throughout the paper.
3.3 Security Component
The security goals, namely data confidentiality, integrity,
authentication, and authorization can broadly be catego-
rized as an identity and access management problem. So
the first component of the proposed framework is designed
by considering these aspects. The SC component consists
of two subcomponents, namely Identity Management and
Access Control Management.
3.3.1 Identity Management
In Fog-IoT systems, it is essential that all devices, sensors,
monitors and fog nodes must have trusted and unique
identities. Trusted identities would guarantee that all IoT
devices and fog nodes are authenticated. In the proposed
secure integrated framework, any entity which needs to
be the part of a Fog-IoT system must first register with
FO based on a set of attributes. The attributes are further
employed in an ABE scheme to generate the secret keys
which are subsequently used to encrypt the information.
3.3.2 Access Control Management
In Fog-IoT systems, access control management is required
to determine which entity (a device or a user) can access
what resources, such as read or write data, execute pro-
grams, and control actuators. In Fog-IoT systems, both FO
and fog nodes can define access policies for IoT devices
and other nodes. Any device which fulfills the access policy
can request and/or provision resources. In the proposed
framework, the objectives of secure identity management,
authentication and access management are achieved by em-
ploying lightweight cryptographic techniques. To be more
specific, as a part of the SC, an existing ABE scheme [22]
based on elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) is implemented
to enforce robust authentication, and access control in Fog-
IoT systems. From here onwards, [22] is referred to as ECC-
CPABE scheme. ECC-CPABE has four algorithms namely,
Setup, KeyGen, Encrypt and Decrypt.
1. Setup(λ,U)→MPK/MSK - This algorithm is executed
by the FO. It takes as input a security parameter λ and an
attribute universe U and generates the master public and
secret MPK/MSK key pair.
2. KeyGen(MPK,MSK,A) → ku - The secret key ku of
a Fog-IoT entity is generated by FO based on an attribute
set A. This algorithm takes as input master public/secret
key pair MPK/MSK and the attribute set A and outputs
the secret key ku which is subsequently used to decrypt the
messages. The generation of secret keys by FO guarantees
that all devices are authenticated and legitimate.
3. Encrypt(MPK,P,M) → CT - This algorithm takes as
input MPK, P and a plaintext message M and outputs
a ciphertext CT . The CT is generated based on an access
policy. The data confidentiality of the communication is
achieved by encrypting the messages exchanged between
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Fog-IoT entities.
4. Decrypt(CT,P, ku)→M - This algorithm takes as input
a ciphertext CT , access policy and a secret key ku. An entity
can only decrypt the CT if its ku is generated based on the
attributes which are required in P i.e. P ⊆ A. The attributes
in A and P enables the enforcement of robust authentication
and authorization in Fog-IoT systems. In addition to above
algorithms, any hash function could be used in a digital
signature to ensure the integrity of the messages.
TABLE 2: Attributes of Fog-IoT entities and Trust Integration
IDs Access Control Rights Trust Attribute
IoT01 None <0.3 000
IoT02 Read >= 0.3 - 0.4 001
IoT03 Write > 0.4 - 0.5 010
FN01 Delete > 0.5 - 0.6 011
FN02 Read and Execute > 0.6 - 0.7 100
FN03 Modify (Permissions) > 0.7 - 0.8 101
FN04 Special Permisssion > 0.8 - 0.9 110
FN05 All > 0.9 - 1 111
3.3.3 Integration of Trust in ABE Access Control Policies
In this section, the embedment of trust as an attribute in
the access control policy is discussed. Table 2 describes a
few attributes which can be used for identity and access
management in SC. The columns IDs and Access Control
Rights list the identities and the access rights of fog nodes
and IoT devices. Likewise, the columns Trust and Attribute
describe the trust and its corresponding representation re-
quired for the access rights granted to a Fog-IoT entity. It
can be observed that change in trust is triggering a change
in access rights; for instance, an increase/decrease in trust is
resulting in privilege escalation/deescalation respectively.
Let U, A and P be the attribute universe, device attribute
set and access policy (AND-Gate) respectively. Both A and
P are represented with an n-bit string. For brevity of the
expression, both attribute set and its string representation
are denoted by A and same applies to P. For example,
if U = {A1, A2, A3, A4, A5, A6} and an IoT device has
A = {A1, A2, A3} then it is represented as A = 111000.
With regard to embedding trust in A and P, its binary rep-
resentation (i.e. column Attribute in Table 2) corresponding
to an access right is added to the device attribute set and
access policy. Let us suppose A6 attribute now represents
the access rights of an IoT device which can ”Write” (i.e.
010) then its n-bit string would be denoted as A = 11100010.
If P is defined over A1, A2, A3, A6 and A6 = 001 which is
”Read” access (i.e. 001) then it is denoted as P = 11100001.
It is maintained that an IoT device with attribute set A
fulfills the access policy P, if and only if P ⊆ A. The device
access rights are granted based on its trust value that must
be greater than or equal to the access policy; otherwise,
the access is denied. The simplest example of access denial
could be the inability to decrypt the ciphertext.
3.4 Trust Management Component
In this section, we discuss the second component of the
proposed framework. TMC is adopted from the authors’
previously published work in [23]. The TMC component
consists of several subcomponents, namely Trust Table, Fog
Node Trust Computation, IoT Device Trust Computation, QoS
Monitoring, IoT Device Parameter Monitoring and Resource
Allocation, and Management. The different sub-components
of TMC are interdependent and enable the accurate and
precise computation of the trust results. Through TMC, FO
computes the trust between various Fog-IoT entities.
Resource allocation and management subcomponent is re-
sponsible for entertaining the service requests sent by dif-
ferent IoT devices and other Fog-IoT components. Moreover,
for trust computation, the QoS and network communication
parameters are monitored by QoS monitoring and IoT device
parameter monitoring subcomponents. Subsequently, the trust
for fog nodes and IoT devices are computed by Fog Node
Trust Computation and IoT Device Trust Computation subcom-
ponents.
3.4.1 Trust Table
After computing the trust for fog nodes and IoT devices
trust, FO stores them in the Trust Table. Any entity can query
FO to get the trust of other fog nodes and IoT devices. That
would, in turn, help in deciding whether to collaborate with
the specific entity or not.
3.4.2 Resource Allocation and Management
The resource allocation and management subcomponent
takes a set of requirements as input and subsequently as-
signs service requests to available fog nodes. It also orches-
trates the distributed services in Fog Nodes layer. FO selects
highly trusted fog nodes based on their trust values.
TABLE 3: Fog Node Trust Parameters
Trust Parameters for Fog Nodes and IoT Devices
Throughput
Bandwidth
Energy Consumption
Transaction Duration
No: of inbound connections per source IP address
No: of inbound connections per destination IP address
3.4.3 QoS Monitoring
FO can employ different methods to monitor the run-time
QoS (Table 3) parameters of the fog nodes. The service
quality parameters can then be retrieved by either pull
or push technique depending upon the Fog-IoT use case.
Moreover, it is essential that FO must guarantee that only
trusted fog nodes are deployed and they are maintaining
an acceptable service quality abiding by the service level
agreement (SLA).
3.4.4 IoT Device Parameter Monitoring
An IoT device parameter monitoring subcomponent is in-
stalled in each IoT device and sensor node to monitor
network communication parameters. This subcomponent
enables the IoT devices to quantify how much of their
resources, namely energy, response time, and bandwidth,
are being utilized for communicating with a particular fog
node. The parameters are further compared with a set of
predefined values to ensure that IoT devices and/or fog
nodes are reachable and functioning correctly.
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3.4.5 Fog Node Trust Computation
For trust computation of fog nodes, two sources of evidence,
namely QoS parameters and network communication
features, similar to [23], are used. Precisely, the trust of
a fog node Tfog is computed by aggregating the trust
computed from QoS evidence monitored by FO and the
network communication parameters sent by IoT devices.
The trust computed by QoS parameters is referred to as
the ”Objective” trust denoted by Tfo→fog whereas the
trust computed by the parameters sent by the IoT devices
is referred to as ”IoT Device” trust denoted by Tiot→fog .
In both these cases, instant trust degree Tt i.e., trust at
a time instance t is predicted by employing a random
forest regression model [24]. In prediction problems, the
regression models are trained over a substantial number
of samples to improve the accuracy. It then compares the
quantified parameters with the already stored SLA values
and based on which computes the trust of fog nodes.
- Objective Trust Computation
FO monitors the CPU frequency, memory size, hard disk
capacity, average response time, and task success ratio of
each fog node. Tfo→fog is computed after a specific time
window n (i.e., one hour, day, or month). n can be divided
into smaller time instances t. FO monitors the fog nodes
at each time instance t based on the QoS parameters and
predicts the instant trust degree Tt(fi) by employing a
random forest regression model. Subsequently, the objective
trust Tfo→fog over a time window n is computed using
equation (1):
Tfo→fog = T̄× w(fi) =
n∑
t=1
(Tt(fi)× wt(fi)), (1)
where fi is the ith fog node, wt(fi) ∈ [0, 1] is the weight
assigned to each instant trust degree Tt(fi) and is calculated
by equation (2).
wt(fi) =
(1− (t+ 1)−1)
n∑
t=1
(1− (t+ 1)−1)
(2)
w(fi) = {w1(fi), w2(fi), ..., wn(fi)}, and
n∑
t=1
wt(fi) = 1.
w is a time-based attenuation function which assigns
more weight to Tt(fi) computed at a recent time instance.
As the fog nodes parameters change over time so the
recently monitored parameters and subsequently Tt(fi) is
given more weight.
- IoT Device Trust Computation
Like Tfo→fog , the instant trust degree Tt(di) of IoT device
di at a time instance t is predicted based on a set of network
communication features. Tt(di) is predicted by a random
forest regression model. Subsequently, Tt from all devices
is averaged to calculate Tiot→fog using Equation (3)
Tiot→fog =
p∑
i=1
Tt(di)
p
(3)
where Tt(di) is the trust predicted from the ith set of
network communication features sent by the IoT devices
provisioning services from a fog node fj and p is the total
number of parameter sets. Note that Tiot→fog is calculated
by obtaining a simple average over all instant degree trust
Tt(di) for a fog node. No weight is assigned to Tiot→fog .
Finally, the fog node trust is calculated using equation 4:
Tfog = α×Tiot→fog + (1− α)×Tfo→fog (4)
where α ∈ (0, 1) is the weight of Tiot→fog , and, (1−α) is the
weight of Tfo→fog . If α is assigned a value of 1, the weight
of Tfo→fog becomes 0 and equation 4 will only consider
Tiot→fog trust. In other words, the evidence of IoT devices
is employed in trust computation of fog nodes, which might
not be a correct evaluation of fog nodes’ performance.
It is recommended that α should be chosen after careful
analysis of fog nodes and IoT devices. The credibility of
Tiot→fog trust is evaluated based on the model discussed in
subsequent subsection.
3.4.6 Trust Credibility Assessment
As the Fog-IoT systems are located in open and unpro-
tected environments, they are vulnerable to several secu-
rity attacks as discussed in section 3.2. A trust credibility
assessment model is designed to mitigate the attacks and
to guarantee accurate and precise trust computation. The
credibility model adjusts the trust of Fog-IoT entities in
three cases whereby the IoT devices, fog nodes, and FO
could be compromised. Trust credibility evaluation is ap-
plied in all computations i.e. Tfog , Tiot→fog and Tfo→fog ,
and “large” differences are adjusted. It is underlined that
when new IoT devices and fog nodes are taking part in
the network their few initial trust values are expected to
be 0.5. Trust increases/decreases as the network operates.
Trust credibility evaluation model analyses the change in T
during consecutive time instances [t0, t] and subsequently
recomputes the trust in recent time instance t using Eq. (5):
Tt = Tt0 ± σTt, (5)
where σ is the standard deviation in T over a time window
n. The standard deviation σ informs about the spread of the
possible values of trust. σ is computed by Eq. (6):
σ =
√∑
(T− µ)2
n
(6)
where µ is mean of trust T at a time instance t. The standard
deviation should be considered for every newly calculated
trust value. If the trust T in recent time instance t is less
than the previous time t0 and the difference is greater than
σ, then T in t is increased, otherwise it is decreased.
3.4.7 IoT Device Trust Computation
This subcomponent computes the trust of IoT devices based
on the parameters monitored by the fog nodes. The fog
nodes also report parameters to FO, which compute the
trust for each IoT device using Equation 3.
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4 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Two experiments are designed to evaluate the effective-
ness of the proposed integrated framework. In the first
experiment, the ECC-CPABE scheme in SC component is
evaluated. In the second experiment, the TMC is evaluated
by computing the trust of fog nodes and IoT devices. Addi-
tionally, in the second experiment, integration of two com-
ponents is elaborated by embedding trust of an entity in an
access policy and subsequently describing its corresponding
access control rights.
System Configuration - The proposed framework is eval-
uated on Raspberry Pi 3 model B+. It has Quad Core
1.2GHz, 64 bit CPU, 1 GB of RAM, a wireless LAN and
Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) on board, 100 Base Ethernet,
40-pin extended GPIO, 4 USB ports, HDMI and micro SD
port. Charm crypto [25], Octave [26], and a few machine
learning libraries were installed for implementing SC and
TMC, respectively. Charm crypto library [25] is used for the
implementation of ABE schemes. GNU Octave is a high-
level language similar to Matlab and used for executing
the trust model. Random forest regression model is imple-
mented using the ”sklearn” python library.
Fig. 2: Processing time (sec) for Setup Algorithm
4.1 First Experiment - SC Evaluation
As mentioned in section 3.3, the identity and access manage-
ment (SC component) in Fog-IoT systems is implemented
by employing an existing ABE scheme [22]. The algorithmic
efficiency of ECC-CPABE [22] for lightweight IoT devices
is measured in terms of time and memory complexity.
This scheme is also compared with other ABE schemes,
PP-CPABE15 [27], CPABE14 [28], COM-CPABE14 [29], and
CPABE11 [30]. All of the above mentioned schemes are
based on a selective security model in which the adversary
submits the access policy to the challenger before seeing the
secret key.
4.1.1 Implementation and Evaluation
Three of the schemes [27], [29], [30] have been tested on
the super-singular SS512 curve, whereas [28] and ECC-
CPABE [22] are tested on the non super-singular asymmetric
bilinear curve (i.e. MNT159) provided by Charm. Both SS512
and MNT159 curves provide 80-bit security.
Fig. 3: Processing time (sec) for KeyGen Algorithm
Fig. 4: Processing time (sec) for Encrypt and Decrypt (1 KB)
Algorithms
4.1.2 Timing Results
The execution times of all algorithms are recorded to com-
pare the efficiency of different schemes. Timing results are
shown in Figures 2 - 5. For Setup and KeyGen, three
different sizes of attribute universe U and A are considered.
Precisely, an attribute universe U of 10, 20 and 30 attributes
is considered for measuring the timing of Setup Algorithm.
Likewise, for secret key generation, a user attribute set A of
5, 15, and 25 attributes is considered. Moreover, two types of
benchmarks are set for measuring the times for encryption
and decryption, 1) 1 KiloByte (1 KB), and 2) 1 MegaByte (1
MB). Due to the limited resource nature of IoT devices, low
size messages are chosen for encryption and decryption.
Furthermore, in the encryption algorithm, an access
policy P of constant size i.e., five attributes is considered
in all cases. The time required by the Setup algorithm
over attribute universe of 10, 20, and 30 attributes in all
schemes is shown in Fig. 2. It can be observed that COM-
CPABE14 is the fastest, followed by PP-CPABE15 and ECC-
CPABE because there are no pairing operations in its Setup
Algorithm. CPABE11 is the slowest of all schemes. ECC-
CPABE takes 0.09, 0.18 and 0.26 seconds over U of 10,
20, and 30 attributes. Overall, the Setup algorithm in all
schemes is fast. Fig. 3 lists the execution time of theKeyGen
Algorithm in all schemes. It can be observed that this time
CPABE14 is the fastest compared to all other schemes. It
only takes 0.005 seconds for secret key generation over 10,
20 and, 30 attributes. ECC-CPABE takes 0.1, 0.2, and 0.27
seconds for 10, 20, and 30 attributes. Moreover, it can be
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Fig. 5: Processing time (sec) for Encrypt and Decrypt (1 MB)
Algorithms
observed that both ECC-CPABE and CPABE11 take equal
time for secret key generation. COM-CPABE14 is the slowest
of all schemes.
The execution timings of encrypting and decrypting
message size of 1 KB are shown in Fig. 4. CPABE takes
0.15 seconds, CPABE11 takes 0.18 seconds, ECC-CPABE
takes 0.3 seconds, PP-CPABE takes 0.33 seconds, and COM-
CPABE14 takes 1.5 seconds. COM-CPABE14 is the slowest of
all schemes. Additionally in decryption, ECC-CPABE is the
fastest of all schemes as it only takes 0.08 seconds to decrypt
a message of 1 KB, followed by CPABE11, which takes
0.31 seconds. CPABE14 and PP-CPABE15 take 0.6 and 0.94
seconds, respectively. COM-CPABE14 takes the longest time
i.e., 1.84 seconds compared to other schemes. Fig. 5 shows
the timing results when a message of 1 MB is encrypted
and decrypted. Comparing figures 4 and 5, it is clear that all
the schemes follow the same timing trend for encryption/
decryption of 1 KB and 1 MB messages. The timings for 1
MB message are just a multiple of 1 KB message.
TABLE 4: Benign and Botnet Attacking Scenarios
Benign Scenarios
Smart home with a weather station,
smart fridge, smart lights, smart garage,
and smart thermostat
Protocols - ARP, IPv6-ICMP, TCP and UDP
Botnet Scenarios
Categories Subcategories
DoS, DDoS UDP, TCP, and HTTP
Probing
Port scanning,
OS fingerprinting
Information Theft Data theft, Keylogging
4.2 Second Experiment - TMC Evaluation
This experiment is designed to achieve three objectives, 1)
computing trust for Fog-IoT nodes based on the proposed
TMC, 2) demonstrating the effectiveness of the credibility
model to compute precise and accurate trust and 3) integra-
tion of SC and TMC components.
4.2.1 Experimental Setup
For evaluating TMC, the BoT-IoT dataset generated by
Nickolaos et al. [31] is used. The testbed for dataset con-
sists of several VMs, including both legitimate Ubuntu and
attacking Kali Linux machines. IoT sensors are simulated on
Ubuntu VMs using Node-red, which were connected with
the public IoT hub, AWS. Java scripts are written on the
Node-red for subscribing and publishing IoT services to the
IoT gateway of the AWS via the Message Queuing Telemetry
Transport (MQTT) protocol.
The dataset is quite large (approximately 18 GB), consist-
ing of 73360900 rows. It has 47 features, including protocol,
source and destination IP addresses, port numbers, packet
counts, bytes, data rate, and traffic categories, etc. Smart
home with five services, namely, Smart Refrigerator, Smart
Garage door, Weather Monitoring System, Smart Lights, and
Smart thermostat, is simulated to model a benign scenario.
Several botnet scenarios, namely, DoS, DDoS, probing, and
information theft are modelled. DoS and DDoS are modelled
for UDP, TCP, and HTTP traffic. For more details, interested
readers are encouraged to read [31]. The benign and botnet
scenarios are listed in Table 4.
4.2.2 Trust Parameters
As discussed in section 3.4, the trust of fog nodes is com-
puted by aggregating Tfo→fog and Tiot→fog based on
the parameters listed in Table 3. Tfo→fog is calculated
from the features in the dataset. For instance, the ’dur’
and ’rate’ features are used for transaction duration and
throughput. Bandwidth is calculated from ’rate’ using the
Nyquist formula, and likewise, energy is calculated for each
transaction. Additionally, two features ’number of inbound
connections’ for each source and destination IP address are
also considered as these were useful in the classification of
botnet attacks, notably DoS and DDoS. As IoT services are
running on the Ubuntu VMs, so the parameters required for
Tiot→fog cannot be measured. So, Tiot→fog parameters are
generated based on the distribution of the respective fea-
tures in the dataset, and are subsequently used as features
in the random forest regression model.
Fig. 6: Fog Nodes Trust in Benign Scenario
4.2.3 Trust Label Generation
After calculating the parameters, the next task is to generate
trust labels. The average is calculated for every subgroup of
benign and botnet scenarios listed in Table 4. Subsequently,
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Fig. 7: Fog Nodes Trust in Botnet Scenarios
every sample in the dataset is compared with the average of
the benign scenarios and their particular botnet scenarios to
find the normality and based on which the trust label (i.e.,
instant trust degree Ti) is predicted by employing random
forest regression. Precisely, objective trust Tfo→fog gets a
high value if the throughput and transaction are high, and
bandwidth and energy consumption is low. The number of
inbound connections per source and destination addresses
increases dramatically from 10-20 to 100-200 in the case of
DoS and DDOS attacks and helps in the assignment of trust
labels. Similarly, the IoT Device trust Tfog→iot is assigned a
higher value if the parameters reported by IoT devices are in
a given range quantified by averaging the parameter values.
Train-Test Split: Next, the dataset is partitioned, and 80% of
the samples are used for training whereas 20% are used for
testing. After intensive training of the regression model, it
is tested with the remaining 20% of the data samples. The
prediction accuracy of the random forest model is turned
out to be 98% resulting in 2% mean square error (MSE) in
predicted trust label and actual trust label.
It is underlined that the selection of a suitable regression
algorithm was done by evaluating several other models,
namely, multiple linear regression (MLR) and support vec-
tor machine regression (SVM). All algorithms were evalu-
ated on MSE and the one with least MSE is selected. The
MSE was 10% and 19% for MLR and SVM respectively.
As random forest regression gave the highest prediction
accuracy and the least MSE (2%), so it was selected.
4.2.4 Fog-IoT Entities Trust Results
The trust of fog nodes is computed based on the equations
1, 3 and 4 presented in section 3.4.5. For fog nodes, there are
three results, namely, IoT device trust Tiot→fog , objective
trust Tfo→fog , and fog node trust Tfog . As the equations
are based on a notion of time, so it is assumed that each of
the botnet scenarios is taking place in a specific time period.
Precisely, when analyzing the results, the notion of time
should be considered. The notations Tiiot→fog , T
i
fo→fog ,
Tifog and ti denote IoT device, objective and fog node trust
calculated at ith time instance t respectively. All trust results
TABLE 5: Fog Node Trust
Scenarios Tiot→fog Tfo→fog Tfog ACR
Benign (α = 0.5)
ARP 0.45 0.49 0.47 Write
IPv6-ICMP 0.52 0.57 0.56 Delete
UDP 0.59 0.62 0.59 Delete
TCP 0.78 0.79 0.77 Modify
Botnet (α = 0.3)
DoS (HTTP) 0.14 0.19 0.17 None
DoS (TCP) 0.17 0.28 0.25 None
DoS (UDP) 0.28 0.34 0.32 Read
DDoS (HTTP) 0.14 0.14 0.14 None
DDoS (TCP) 0.15 0.19 0.18 None
DDoS (UDP) 0.26 0.27 0.27 None
OS Fingerprint 0.11 0.17 0.15 None
Service scan 0.13 0.19 0.17 None
Data Exflitration 0.21 0.36 0.32 Read
Keylogging 0.06 0.10 0.09 None
and the access control rights (ACR) in benign and botnet
scenarios are listed in Table 5.
1. IoT Device Trust Tiot→fog - Fig. 6 illustrates Tiot→fog
calculated using Equation (3) presented in section 3.4.5. It
is the average of Tt(di) calculated using throughput, band-
width, energy consumption, and transaction duration and
predicted using the random forest regression model. As the
dataset does not contain a feature mentioning the number
of IoT devices provisioning services from each source IP
address (fog nodes in this case), so, it is calculated based
on the number of transactions for each source IP address.
In a benign scenario, the trust of an IoT device using the
ARP protocol is 0.45, IPv6-ICMP is 0.52, UDP is 0.59 and
TCP is 0.78. Comparing the benign results in Fig. 6 with the
botnet in Fig. 7 (a) and (b), it can be observed that Tiot→fog
decreases from 0.78 to 0.06. In botnet scenarios, Tiot→fog
lies between 0.06 and 0.28 indicating a distrust.
2. Objective Trust Tfo→fog - Fig. 6 lists Tfo→fog values
calculated using Equation (1) presented in section 3.4.5.
Tfo→fog values in benign scenarios for different protocols
are 0.49, 0.57, 0.62 and 0.79 respectively. Similar to Tiot→fog ,
Tfog→fog also decreases sharply in botnet scenarios. For
instance, in DoS (HTTP), it is 0.19, and overall it is between
0.10 to 0.36, which again indicates a low trust and possibly
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Fig. 8: Fog Nodes Trust in Botnet Scenarios
a compromised node.
3. Fog Node Trust Tfog - Having computed Tiot→fog
and Tfog→fog , the FO aggregates them to compute Tfog
using Equation (4) presented in section 3.4.5. The weights
assigned to α in Equation (4) are carefully chosen to avoid
any artificial tuning. As the data is already labelled, so it
was easier for us to do so. In benign scenarios, both Tfo→fog
and Tiot→fog are assigned equal weights of 0.5. However, in
botnet scenarios, α = 0.3 is selected for Tiot→fog , meaning
that Tfo→fog will get more weightage when IoT devices
are malicious and reporting false parameters. Again as the
data is labelled so, a constant value is assigned to all botnet
scenarios.
Fig. 6 illustrates Tfog trust, it is 0.47, 0.56, 0.59 and 0.77 in
different protocols. As Tfog is greater than the threshold 0.5,
the fog nodes are considered trustworthy. 0.5 threshold is
selected to guarantee that the devices are trustworthy with
at least 50% probability. Similarly, Tfog in DoS in HTTP, TCP
and UDP subcategories is 0.17, 0.25 and 0.32 respectively.
For DDoS, it is 0.14, 0.18 and 0.27 in different subcategories.
For probing attacks, it is 0.15 for OS fingerprint and 0.17
for service scan. Lastly, in case of data theft attacks, data
exfiltration and keylogging, Tfog is 0.32 and 0.09.
4. Trust and Access Control Rights - Table 5 lists the
access control rights (see Table 2) granted based on Tfog .
For brevity of expression, the access rights are granted based
on Tfog alone. It can be observed that in benign scenarios,
ACRs are write, delete and modify, however in case of botnet it
is either none or read-only. In normal circumstances, the trust
would not change very frequently and, therefore, access
rights. However, monitoring the rate of change of trust can
help detect and prevent malicious activities.
4.2.5 Credibility Evaluation
This experiment is designed to evaluate the credibil-
ity model’s effectiveness in maintaining the accuracy of
trust computation model even in the presence of mali-
cious/compromised fog nodes and IoT devices. Trust results
from previous section underline that the trust decreases in
all botnet attacking scenarios. The attacks are labelled in the
dataset and therefore the trust computation are comprehen-
TABLE 6: Fog Node Trust Credibility Evaluation
Scenarios Without Credibility With Credibility
Tfog ACR Tfog ACR
DoS (HTTP) 0.17 None 0.57 Delete
DoS (TCP) 0.25 None 0.62 Read & Execute
DoS (UDP) 0.32 Read 0.82 Special
DDoS (HTTP) 0.14 None 0.68 Read & Execute
DDoS (TCP) 0.18 None 0.46 Write
DDoS (UDP) 0.27 None 0.27 None
OS Fingerprint 0.15 None 0.55 Delete
Service scan 0.17 None 0.61 Read & Execute
Data Exflitration 0.32 Read 0.47 Write
Keylogging 0.09 None 0.60 Delete
sive and in agreement with the parameters. However, as
the malicious adversaries attack the fog nodes, they cannot
be labelled as untrusted. Moreover, some malicious nodes
can purposefully send false parameters to decrease the trust
of fog nodes in open and distributed systems. Trust values
help detect the network intrusions, but at the same time, FO
needs to mitigate their impact by evaluating their credibility
and comparing it with its calculations.
Next, the credibility of Tfog in DoS, DDoS, probing
and data theft attacks is evaluated. Equation 5 is based
on the notion of time, so it is assumed that all benign
and botnet scenarios have occurred in specific time periods.
However, for finding an appropriate value of σ, the standard
deviation in a benign scenario by considering all protocols is
calculated using Eq. (6). Similarly, σ in four botnet scenarios
is also computed. Subsequently, σ in botnet scenarios is
added up and subtracted from the benign scenario’s value.
Following the above computational procedure, σ = 0.07 is
found and subsequently used in the credibility evaluation
model.
Fig. 8 and Table 6 list Tfog calculated with and without
credibility evaluation and the corresponding ACRs. As can
be observed from Fig. 8(a), Tfog in DoS without credibility
in HTTP is 0.17, TCP is 0.25, and UDP is 0.32. However,
after credibility evaluation and comparing the results with
the benign values in previous time t0, Tfog is adjusted to
0.57, 0.62, and 0.82. The ACR is also adjusted from none,
read to delete and special permissions. Similarly, in DDoS
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categories, Tfog without credibility evaluation is 0.14, 0.18,
and 0.27 with no access right. With credibility evaluation,
Tfog in DDoS(HTTP) increased to 0.68, DDOS(TCP) to
0.46, and DDOS(UDP) to 0.27. ACRs have also change to
read & execute, write and none respectively. Tfog results
for probing (OS fingerprint, service scan) and data theft
(data exflitration, keylogging) with or without credibility
evaluation are shown in fig. 8(b). It can be observed that
trust has increased due to a big difference between the value
in a benign scenario in t0 time instance and the σ.
Comparing the results in Table 6, it can be analysed that
in all botnet scenarios, Tfog without credibility calculations
remained between 0.09 and 0.32. It was lowest in the case
of the keylogging attack in the data theft subcategory and
highest in the data exfiltration, again in the same category.
In both cases, it is increased to 0.6 and 0.47 respectively and
the ACRs changed from read and none to delete and write
respectively. The above results underpin the significance
of the credibility model in calculating accurate and precise
trust computations.
4.2.6 Comparative Analysis
The proposed scheme is compared with [32] in which a
trust model is proposed for cloud based IoT systems. A
major limitation of this work is not putting a check on
false/fabricated data and let it be incorporated in trust
computation. The use of false parameters in the trust model
leads to inaccurate Tiot→fog which does not fall between
-1 and 1, as reported in Eq. (1) and (2) in section 6 of [32].
In contrast to this, our proposed TMC follows a two-fold
approach to guarantee an accurate trust computation. First,
it detects data anomalies and discards any data which is
out of the range of trust parameters. Second, the credibility
model countermeasures any discrepancies introduced in the
calculated trust values. The comparison is based on two
cases, 1) Case-1 wherein trust parameters greater than Vmax
(upper limit of range), and 2) Case-2 wherein trust parame-
ter less than Vmin (lower limit of range) are considered.
Fig 9(a) and (b) show Tiot→fog calculated by both trust
models. In Case-1, the parameter values greater than Vmax
are considered. Fig. 9(a) shows Tiot→fog results from both
models. It can be observed that Tiot→fog computed by our
model lies between 0.1 to 0.5, whereas it is between 0.48
to 0.99 from [32]. Tiot→fog is high despite wrong values
resulting into inaccurate trust. In Case-2, the parameter
values less than Vmin are considered. Tiot→fog calculated
in Case-2 are shown in fig. 9(b). Like Case-1, the trust model
of [32] again fails to evaluate the credibility of parameters
and subsequently resulting into false trust estimation equal
to 1 for all samples.
4.2.7 TMC Overhead
Fig. 10 reports the overheads of the different trust results
namely, objective trust Tfo→fog , IoT Device trust Tiot→fog ,
trust credibility evaluation and fog node trust Tfog . It is
noted that the random forest regression executed as part
of the objective trust Tfo→fog computation took only 2.23
seconds. Fog node Tfog trust calculation took 0.72 seconds.
However, the IoT device trust computation Tiot→fog took
3.98 seconds. Time taken by Tiot→fog is the sum of time
required for data normalization, random forest regression
training, and testing. Additionally, the trust credibility eval-
uation took just 0.27 seconds. Lastly, the entire trust com-
putation is done in 7.2 seconds. The results demonstrate
that the proposed TMC is lightweight and incurs small
computation overhead even on a Raspberry Pi 3.
5 CONCLUSION
In this paper, a secure integrated framework for Fog-IoT
systems is proposed. The proposed framework is designed
after a thorough investigation of these systems. Various
dimensions (i.e., security, trustworthiness, and service or-
chestration) of Fog-IoT systems are studied to find the
vulnerabilities and threats faced by such complex and inher-
ently heterogeneous systems. After identifying the security
and trust challenges, efforts were made to find a solution.
However, soon it had been clear that Fog-IoT systems re-
quire an integrated approach that addresses these issues
simultaneously; as the limitations and/or absence of one
solution can be exploited by malicious attackers to disrupt
these systems and impact their availability.
The SC component ensures security by achieving data
confidentiality, integrity, authentication, and access control
through a lightweight ABE scheme based on elliptic curves.
The identity management and access control management
subcomponents guarantee that fog nodes and IoT devices
are authenticated and authorized. The TMC guarantees
the dependability of Fog-IoT entities by computing their
trust, based on QoS parameters and other performance
indicators. The BotIoT dataset used in TMC evaluation has
labelled samples for eight attacking scenarios, including
DoS, DDoS, probing, and data theft, so trust is calculated
for every scenario and compared with the benign results.
Additionally, the credibility of trust is evaluated to highlight
the detection and prevention of network intrusions. Trust
is further used in defining access control rights for each
fog node and IoT device. Moreover, the performance of
the proposed framework is experimentally evaluated by
implementing SC and TMC on a Raspberry Pi 3 model B.
The results demonstrate that a resource constrained device
i.e., Raspberry Pi, can execute the encryption scheme and
regression models without incurring significant overheads.
From experimental evaluations, it is concluded that
lightweight solutions like those proposed in this paper can
solve the numerous security and trust problems faced by
Fog-IoT systems. Overall, it is believed that this research
is timely, and the proposed secure integrated framework
is a step in the right direction. As future work, the re-
searchers aim to include other attacking scenarios namely,
collusion, Sybil, bad-mouthing, and ballot-stuffing, in trust
and credibility evaluation. Moreover, we aim to extend
the proposed secure integrated framework to address the
privacy challenges faced by the Fog-IoT systems.
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